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In the Uourt of .Exchequer-IfilaryTerm.
FURBER VS. STURMY.

On an execution in a county court against the goods of the defendant, in a suit of
A. vs. B., certain goods in the hands of C. were seized, who paid a sum of money
to release them, and proeeeded by interpleader. It appeared that the goods originally belonged to B., but previous to the execution had been pawned with a
pawnbroker, it did not appear by whom, and the duplicates had been deposited in
the hands of C. by L. to redeem them, and hold them as security for the money
advanced, who redeemed them accordingly. There was no evidence to show the
time at which, or the circumstances under which L. became possessed of the
duplicates, or that he had any interest therein: Held, that C. was entitled to the
money paid to release the goods.

This was an appeal from the decision of a county court. The
defendant having obtained a judgment in that court against one B.,
execution was issued on the 3d March, 1858, and certain goods in
the hands of the plaintiff seized by the bailiff on the 21st April,
1858. The plaintiff, who claimed a right to the goods, paid 341.
4s. 9d. to the bailiff to release them, and took out an interpleader
summons, whereupon an issue was tried between himself and the
defendant. In the statement of the case it was found that the
goods originally belonged to B., and that the defendant was entitled to the money paid to the bailiff by the claimant, unless the
claimant was entitled thereto under the circumstances detailed in
the case. The goods had been pav'ned from time to time with different pawnbrokers, but there was no evidence to show by whom;
and on the 15th of April, 1857, the pawnbroking tickets or duplicates were deposited with the claimant by one L., upon the terms
that they should be redeemed by him, and, when redeemed, held by
him as security for the money advanced in redeeming them, and
other moneys, until they could be sold by auction by the claimant,
who upon such sale should retain the moneys and expenses of the
sale, and pay the balance (if any) over to L. The case also found
that there was no legal evidence to show the time at which, or the
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circumstances under which, L. became possessed of the duplicates,
or that he had any interest therein; but the judge of the county
court drew the inference from the facts, and found as matter of fact,
that if the goods had been pawned by or with the authority of B.,
L. had the possession of the duplicates, and deposited them in the
plaintiff's hands, as a mere agent of the execution debtor; and that
before they were handed over to the plaintiff, or any contract or
agreement so to do had been entered into, L. had notice of the
issuing of the writ of execution. The plaintiff, after he received
the duplicates, redeemed the goods, and for that purpose advanced
1921. 11s. 4d., and sent them to an auction room for the purpose
of selling them, where they were seized by the bailiff. The question was, whether the plaintiff was entitled to the money paid by
him to the bailiff. This the county court judge decided against the
plaintiff, on the ground of the total absence of legal evidence on his
behalf, and gave judgment for the defendant, with costs.
Lush, for the appellant.-The plaintiff, having given value to the
pawnbroker for these goods, stands in the position of the pawnbroker, whose lien is an effectual bar to any judgment subsequent to
the pawning; and even supposing they could be seized in execution as the goods of B., the lien would prevent any sale under that
execution. In Scott vs. Scholey, 8 East, 467, it was held that a
mere equitable interest in a term of years cannot be taken in execution on a fieri facias at the suit of a judgment creditor. Boyers
vs. IKennay, 9 Q. B. 592, seems in point. It was there held, that
under an execution against the goods of A., the sheriff cannot seize
goods which A. deposited with another person as security for a
debt. There, goods in the possession of A. having been taken in
execution at the suit of B. and C., and an interpleader issue having
been ordered to try whether A. (the plaintiff in the issue) had any
property in the goods as against B., (the defendant in the issue), it
was held that the issue on the plaintiff's part was maintained by
showing a lien on the goods for money due to him from C.
_Phipson, for the respondent.-All the facts having been found
by the county court judge against the plaintiff, the defendant is
entitled to retain the judgment, unless it appears, on the facts
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found, that as matter of law he cannot do so. [Pollock, 0. B.We must look on the statement sent to us as consisting of a decision accompanied by a special case, and we are to say what conclusion we should reasonably draw from the facts therein stated.] The
title of the plaintiff does not depend on that of the pawnbroker, but
on that of L., by whom the duplicates were given to him. The
onus lies on the plaintiff to make out his title to these goods.
[Martin, ]B.-That is the whole question. The plaintiff is in possession of the goods, which puts the onus upon you to show your
title.] We do so, for we trace the duplicates to L., whose title does
not appear, and it is not shown that the goods were pledged by B.,
the original owner, or by L. as his agent.
Lush, in reply, admitted that the question was, on whom the
burthen of proof lay, and cited Franklin vs. .Neate, 13 M. & W.
431.
POLLOCK, C. B.-We are all of opinion tbat the appellant is
entitled to our judgment, and that the judgment of the judge of the
county court must consequently be reversed. I can well understand
the principle on which he proceeded-he seems to have thought
that the writ bound the property, into whosesoever hands it came,
unless it was made out with perfect strictness that some other person was entitled to it. Now, I think that the plaintiff's title to it
is sufficiently made out to call on us to give judgment against the
defendant. The case as it stands does not in the slightest degree
displace the fact of the goods being in the plaintiff's own possession ; they were pawned, he receives the duplicates of them, redeems
and takes possession of them. Surely he has a right to' redeem
them, as against the original owner, until he is reimbursed the
money advanced to redeem them. We are not to presume anything
wrong-all presumptions of law proceed on the principle that every
man does right until the contrary appears. If, then, the plaintiff
had a lien on these goods against the owner, he had equally a lien
on them against any person claiming them under a writ of execution. The shortest way is to dispose of the case on this ground,
and waive all inquiry as to whether these goods could have been
taken in execution when in the possession of the pawnbroker; in
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other words, how far the plaintiff is to be looked on as standing in
the position of the pawnbroker.
MARTIN, B.-If the present case had arisen with respect to a
sum of money greater than the 1921. 11s. 6d. paid by the plaintiff
to redeem the goods, a different question might arise; but as his
claim is for a sum considerably less, viz., 841. 4s. 9d., he stands in
the same condition as the pawnbroker; for by paying this money
to the pawnbroker he obtains whatever interest the pawnbroker
had, and the question is the same as if the execution had been executed on the goods while in possession of the pawnbroker. The
pawnbroker found in actual possession of the goods may have
become so either lawfully or not. If lawfully, cadit quostio; if
not, the question is, are any facts disclosed in this case (looking on
it either as a special case or a special verdict) showing that the
creditor of the execution debtor is entitled to take them in execution ? Now, I take it, if you seek to disturb a man's possession,
you must show that the party under whom you claim was fairly the
owner of the property, and that the presumption from possession is
not displaced by merely showing that some other person had once
been their owner.
WATSON, B.-Possession of property is prima facia evidence of
title. These goods originally belonged to B.; that they were from
time to time pawned with different pawnbrokers; and not only is
possession in the plaintiff proved, but it does not appear that he
obtained it wrongfully in any way; and no claim was ever made by
B. to the goods, on the ground that what was done by the plaintiff
was not lawfully done. The defendant, however, seeks to meet that
case by saying that the plaintiff was bound to go farther, and show
how the person who gave him the duplicates became entitled to
them, which may have been by virtue of transactions five or six
years ago. It would give rise to the greatest difficulties in the
world if you were to drive every person to show a complete title in
such a case; and here the plaintiff has shown a very strong prima
facia one.
OHANNELL, B., concurred.-Judgmentfor the appellant.

DUFAUR vs. LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY.

In the Roll8 (ourt.
DUFAUR VS. THE PROFESSIONAL LIFE ASSURRANCE COMPANY.
1. Where the life policy contained a provision that should the assured commit
suicide the policy should be void, and the assured died by his own hand, being of
unsound mind as found bythe coroner's jury; held that the state of mind of the
party committing suicide was not material, and that ",suicide" could not be distinguished from "dying by his own hand;" which has been held to be within a

like proviso.

Per Master of the Rolls.

2. Where the assured had deposited the policy with a creditor as security for a debt
due and for advances, without notice of the deposit to the office, and the assignee
had continued to pay the accruing premiums; held that it was a valid deposit and
assignment, and that the assignee, who was also administrator, was entitled to
recover the advances made for the assured's benefit.

By a policy of assurance dated in March, 1851, granted by the
defendants, the life of James Laird, a surgeon in the navy, then of
Bermuda, was insured in the sum of 3001. on the proposal of the
insured.
The policy contained the following proviso, that "in case the
assured shall, during the continuance of this policy, go beyond the
limits of Europe, or die on the high seas, except in time of peace,
in passing or repassing by land or sea, from one part of Europe to
another, or to or from Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick,
Australasia, Bermuda, Madeira, Cape of Good Hope, or Prince
Edward's Island, or to and from any port or ports of Great Britain
inclusive, or being or becoming a military or naval man, shall enter
into actual service without the previous license of the directors, or
shall commit suicide, or die by duelling, or the hands of.justice,
(when the policy shall be canceled by the return of the premiums
except-the policy shall have been legally assigned,) this policy shall
be void, and all moneys paid in respect thereof shall be forfeited
to the company,"
On the 2d April, 1853, Laird being indebted to the plaintiff, who
was his navy agent, in a considerable amount, deposited the
policy, with him as security for the balance of his account with the
plaintiff then due, or which might thereafter be due to him. No
notice of the deposit was given to the office.
From that time, until the death of Laird, the policy remained in
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the bands of the plaintiff, who paid all the premiums due on the
policy. He received the pay of Laird, and from time to time made
advances to him, and at his death, in 1857, there was due to the
plaintiff, on the balance of the account between them, 1721. 8s. 7d.
Laird died by his own hand, being of unsound mind, as found by
a coroner's jury.
The plaintiff took out letters of administration to the estate of
Laird, and applied to the company to pay the whole amount of the
policy, on the ground that Laird having put an end to his existence
whilst insane, that was not committing suicide within the meaning
of the proviso; or at least the sum due to him under the security of
the deposit to him. The company declined to do more than return
the premiums, contending that the policy was made void by Laird
having committed suicide, and there having been no legal assignment of the policy to the plaintiff.
This bill was filed by Dufaur, praying payment of the amount
payable on the policy; or an account of all moneys due to him on
the security of the deposit of the policy by Laird, and payment by
the company.
Palmer, Q. 0., and Godfrey for the plaintiff, contended that the
defendants were bound to pay the whole policy, on the ground that
Laird had not committed suicide within the meaning of the proviso
in the policy, Dormay vs. Borrodaile,10 Beav. 885, 842; Cook vs.
Black, 1 Hare, 390; Amicable Life Assurance Society vs. Boland,
4 Bligh, N. S. 194; Borrodailevs. Hunter, 5 Man. & Gr. 639; or
that the plaintiff was at least entitled to recover the amount due to
him on the deposit.
The Master of the Rolls said he was of opinion that Laird had
committed suicide within the proviso. The last case cited decided
that the state of mind of the party committing suicide was not
material. He thought that "suicide" could not be distinguished
from "dying by his own hand."
W. W. Cooper, for the defendants, on the second point, contended
that the petitioner had no claim on the company, as the policy had
not been legally assigned.
THE MASTER OF THE ROLLs.-The question which remains to be
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considered is whether this policy has been legally assigned. That
depends upon the meaning to be given to the word "legally," which
must be taken most strongly against the office, as it is inserted by
them for their protection. Now, at law, a policy cannot be assigned
except to the Crown; but it is clear that this is not what is intended
by the limitation. The word cannot be used here in its technical
sense, as opposed to equitable; the word "legal" is generally
employed as equivalent to valid, in which sense the courts of law and
equity will recognize its meaning. There is a technical sense in
which we use the word "legal," that is when we speak of a legal right
as opposed to an equitable one ; but that is not its meaning in common
parlance. I am satisfied that whoever prepared this proviso did not
use the word in its technical sense, but meant that the policy must be
validly and effectually assigned. Whether this has been done in
this case, is a question of evidence. And, upon the evidence, I think
it would be difficult to deny that there was a valid deposit of the
policy with the plaintiff by the insured to secure advances made for
his benefit, and the measure of relief to which the plaintiff is entitled,
is the amount due to him in respect of such advances, not exceeding
the amount of the policy. An account must be taken of what is
due to the plaintiff, unless the account can be settled by arrangement.

In the Court of Queen's Bench.
JACKSON AND ANOTHER VS. FORSTER.

1. A life policy contained the following condition: "This policy willbe void if the
life assured die by his own hands, the hands of justice, by duelling, or by suicide;
but if any third party have acquired a bona fide interest therein by assignment, or
by legal or equitable lien for a valuable consideration, or as security for money,
the assurance thereby effected shall nevertheless, to the extent of such interest,
be valid and of full effect." On the 9th July the assured became bankrupt
according to the laws of Valparaiso, and his property then vested in the escribano,
or officer of the court, who took possession, and on the 15th July assignees were
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appointed, to whom all the property passed by operation of law. On the 14th
July the assured committed suicide.
field, that the assignees were not entitled to the benefit of the poligy under the
above condition, but that the condition was intended to apply where there was a
contract and a transfer by the parties.

This was a special case.
The plaintiffs claim the sum of money in dispute in this case as
assignees of the estate and effects of the late Mr. Matthew de
Bordes, a member of the firm of Mickle & Co., merchants, at Valparaiso, according to the law of that country.
The defendant is one of the directors of the Liverpool and London Fire and Life Insurance Company, and is authorized to sue,
and liable to be sued, for and on behalf of the said company.
On the 9th Oct., 1847, Mr. Matthew de Bordes effected with the
said company a policy of insurance on his own life.
Amongst the conditions of the said policy, the following is the
only material one in this case :"This policy will be void if the life assured die by his own hands, the hands of
justice, by duelling, or by suicide; but if any third party have acquired a bonafide
interest therein, by assignment, or by legal or equitable lien for a valuable consideration, or as security for money, the assurance thereby effected shall nevertheless,
to the extent of such interest, be valid and of full effect, provided the nature and
extent of such interest be proved to the satisfaction of the directors."

On the 9th July, 1856, the firm of Mickle & Co. became bankrupt, according to the course of law at Valparaiso. M. de Bordes
was domiciled at Valparaiso at the time of the bankruptcy, and was
included therein.
The firm of Mickle & Co. made a cession or surrender of the
whole of their estate and effects to their creditors before the Tribunal of Commerce at Valparaiso. The plaintiffs, being creditors
of the said firm, were by such tribunal appointed assignees to the
estate.
On the beforementioned day the partners in the house of Mickle
& Co., including M. de Bordes, according to the law of Chili, and
in conformity with the practice of the country in such cases, presented themselves before the judge of the Consulado Court at Val-
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paraiso, and then and there declared themselves bankrupts. By
that act itself they made in point of law a cession of all their property to tne said court. The property from that moment vested by
operation of law in the escribano, or notary officially attached to the
said court. To the said escribano was delivered by Mickle & Co.,
the key of their counting-house, as and for a sign of the transfer of
all their effects to him; in this act M. de Bordes joined. On the
15th July, 1856, after the declaration of bankruptcy and transfer
of the property, a meeting of the creditors of the said firm of
Mickle & Co. was called, and assignees were appointed thereat.
Upon the appointment of such assignees, ipso facto, the property
of the bankrupt shifted by operation of law from the said escribano
of the said court to and vested in the said assignees.
On the 14th July, 1856, after the said declaration and act of
delivery aforesaid, and before the appointment of the plaintiffs as
assignees as aforesaid, and before they had any interest in the said
policy, M. de Bordes committed suicide. The plaintiffs have not
acquired any bonafide interest in the said policy by assignment, or
by legal or equitable lien for a valuable consideration, or as a security for money, or further or otherwise than as having become such
assignees as aforesaid, and having the property of the said firm of
Mickle & Co. vested in them in the manner aforesaid. All the premiums due upon the policy had been duly paid up to the time of
his death. The question for the opinion of the court was, whether,
under the circumstances, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover. If
the court should be of opinion in the affirmative, judgment was to
be entered for the plaintiffs, against the said company for the said
sum of 6C01. If the court should be of opinion in the negative,
judgment was to be entered for the defendant; and in either case
the costs to follow the event.
Wilde, Q. C., (Coleridge with him,) for the plaintiffs.
On the 9th July, a bona fide interest by assignment as security
for money passed to the escribano, and on the 15th July it passed
from him to the assignees. This was an assignment by operation
of law in every respect bona fide, and for a good consideration.
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The object of this provision in the policy
(Com. Dig. "Assignee.")
is to prevent the assured committing suicide. [Lord CAMPBELL,
C. J.-I should have thought the object was to make the policy a
security in the hands of a third person. CROMPTON, J.-You say,
if there has been an assignment, the claim is good against the office.
Suppose the case of a father insuring his life and assigning to his
child, and committing suicide, the child would be a bona fide
assignee.] There is no difference between an assignment to the
creditor or to the whole body of creditors. This is an assignment
by operation of law. The 1 and 2 Will. 4, c. 56, vests the property
in an insolvent's assignees by virtue of the mere appointment, and
they are in the same position as if there had been an assignment;
here the assignment was bona fide, and as security for money, and
there would be also a sufficient consideration, the insolvent's freedom from the pursuit of his creditors.
Macauley, Q. C., (Raymond with him,) for the defendant.The question turns on the meaning of the exception in the policy.
That exception clearly contemplates a bargain or contract, and is
made in favor of a person who has acquired an interest in the policy
by bargain or some act, not merely the standing in the bankrupt's
shoes. The terms import an interest passing as from the assured
for a valuable consideration, or as a security.
Wilde, Q. C., in reply.-If the company had intended to exclude
bankruptcy, they would have said so in the policy. The court will,
if possible, support the policy.
Lord CAMPBELL, C. J.-I am of opinion that the escribano cannot be considered a third person who has acquired a bona fide interest by assignment, or by legal or equitable lien for a valuable
consideration, or as a security for money, within the meaning of the
condition. If we were to go the length of holding it within that
condition, I think we should go beyond the intention of the parties;
for I do not think that it was the intention that this condition should
extend to cases like the present, where there is no contract. The
escribano and creditors were not consulted; it is clear that there
was no contract, and the case therefore is not within the condition.
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COMPTON, J.-At one time my mind fluctuated a good deal, but,
upon consideration, it is clear that any person claiming as assignee
of a policy must beyond all question bring himself within the meaning of this exception. Now this assignment must be for a valuable
consideration, but I don't think an assignment by operation of law
can be said to be for a valuable consideration. I think the exception points to a transfer by the act of the parties, and not by the
operation of law. To hold otherwise would be to strain the clause.
This cannot be called a bona fide seeurity for a valuable consideration ; the clause rather means where the assignor gets a quid
pro quo.
HILL, J.-I am of the same opinion. I think these words were
used to enable the assured to deal with his policy by sale of it,
or as security for money owing. I think the parties meant an
assignment by the party himself, or by legal or equitable lien. There
must be an act done by the party himself to give a lien; by such
means these policies became more valuable, as being capable of
being dealt with.
Judgment for defendant.

In the Court of Queen's Bench.
LUCAS AND OTHERS VS. BRISTOWE.
A written contract expressed that defendant had bought "fifty tons of best palm
oil, expected to arrive in Bristol from Africa, per the Chalco, at 401. 10s. per ton,
Wet, dirty, and inferior oil, if any, at a fair allowance;
and if any difference should arise, the same to be settled by arbitration." In an
action for not accepting the oil, parol evidence was admitted of a usage of trade
at Bristol, to show that a delivery of a substantial portion of best oil with inferior
usual tare and draught.

descriptions, in the proportion of one-fifth best and four-fifths inferior, would
have been a compliance with the contract:-Held, that the written contract
having left undefined what portion of the oil was to be wet, dirty, and inferior,
the evidence of usage was admissible as explaining its terms.

Declaration for not accepting fifty tons of best palm oil, ex Ohalco,
at 401. 10s. per ton, with usual tare and draught, and upon the
terms that wet, dirty, or inferior oil (if any) should be taken at a
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fair allowance. Plea, that the oil, which arrived per Chalco, and
which the plaintiffs were ready and willing to deliver to him, was
not best palm oil, or fairly within the description in the contract,
but was of a totally different quality, which difference in quality was
so great, and of such a nature, as not to be the subject of allowanco
within the true intent and meaning of the said contract. Issue
thereon. At the trial, before Crowder, J., at the Spring Assizes
at Bristol, it appeared that the action was brought to recover the
sum of 1561. 15s. 9d. from the defendant as damages sustained by
the plaintiffs for the non-performance of the following contract:"Bought this day, for John Bristowe, of Messrs. Lucas, Brothers,
& Co., of Bristol, fifty tons best palm oil, expected to arrive in
Bristol, from Africa, per the Chalco, after the delivery 100 tons
previously sold, at 401. 10s. per ton, usual tare and draught; wet,
dirty, and inferior oil (if any), at a fair allowance; and if any difference should arise, the same to be settled by arbitration. Payment
by cash, on delivery, less 21. 10s. per cent. discount, end of fourteen
days from being ready for delivery in Bristol.-D. Al. & Co., brokers." The oil arrived on the 17th October. The cargo consisted
of 250 tons, sixty tons of which were best palm oil. The usual proportion of the sixty tons of best oil was allotted to the fifty tons purchased by the defendant. The plaintiffs tendered the oil to the
defendant in eighty-seven casks, of which seventeen contained best
and the remainder inferior qualities, for which they offered to make
an allowance. The defendant declined to accept the oil, on the
ground that the delivery of so small a portion as seventeen casks of
best was not a performance of the contract. It was proved that
palm oil imported from the coast of Africa was more or less adultterated with palm-nut oil, and it was therefore usual in the oil trade
for sellers to protect themselves in their contracts of sale by the
insertion of an "1allowance clause" similar to the one in the above
contract. The plaintiffs gave evidence to show, that, according to
the custom of the oil trade at Bristol, the delivery of a substantial
portion of best oil, together with inferior descriptions would have
been a performance of the contract, and that according to the custom
one-fifth best would be considered as a substantial portion. The

LUCAS AND OTHERS vs. BRISTOWE.

defendant objected to the reception of this evidence, as being inconsistent with the written contract; but it was received by the learned
judge, who directed the jury, that if, according to the custom, the
plaintiffs had satisfied the contract, they ought to find a verdict for
them. The jury accordiigly found a verdict for the plaintiffs for
2341. In this term, (April 19.)
Collier obtained a rule to show cause why there should not be a
new trial, on the ground that the evidence of mercantile usage was
not admissible, citing Yates vs. Pym, 6 Taunt. 446; and also on
the ground of misdirection.
Montague Smith and Barstow, now showed cause.-There is
nothing inconsistent or repugnant to the written contract in the
evidence of the custom which was given to explain it. In Brown
vs. Byrne, 3 El. & Bl. 703; 18 Jur. 700 it was held that everything
which shows that the words were used in a mercantile sense is
admissible to explain the contract. Coleridge, J., in delivering the
judgment of the court. said, 3 El. &Bl. 715; 18 Jur. 702, "But
in these cases a restriction is established on the soundest principle,
that the evidence received must not be of a particular which is repugnant to or inconsistent with the written contract. M\1erely that it
varies the apparent contract is not enough to exclude the evidence,
for it is impossible to add any material incident to the written terms
of a contract without altering its effect, more or less. Neither, in
the construction of a contract among merchants, tradesmen, or others,
will the evidence be excluded because the words are in their ordinary meaning unambiguous; for the principle of admission is, that
words perfectly unambiguous in their ordinary meaning are'used by
the contractors in a different sense from that. What words more plain
than 'a thousand,' a week,' 'a day;' yet the cases are familiar in
which ' a thousand' has been held to mean twelve hundred ; ' a week,'
a week only during the theatrical season; Ia day,' a working day.1
In: such cases the evidence neither adds to, nor qualifies, nor contradicts the written contract; it "only ascertains it by expounding
the language." In this contract the word "best" does not stand
1

See Smith vs. Wilson, 3 B. & Ad. 728; Grant vs. Maddox, 15 M. & W. 787; and
Cochran vs. Retberg, 5 Esp. 121.
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alone; the contract allows for "wet, dirty, and inferior." What
proportion of the oil maybe wet, dirty, and inferior mustbe explained
by mercantile usage, otherwise the contract will receive a different
construction from what the parties intended when they entered into
it. The evidence admitted only explains and carries out the contract. Where there is a custom, and that custom is clearly established,
it is only reasonable to suppose that the parties, at the time they
entered into the contract, had such custom or usage in view, and
contracted with reference to such custom. Both parties must be
taken to have known of the custom. Hfumfrey vs. Dale, 7 El. &
Bl. 266; 3 Jur., N. S. 213.1 In the agreement in Yates vs. _P'ym,
6 Taunt. 446, there was no clause stipulating that an allowance
should be made in the event of the bacon not being prime singed
bacon.
Collier and J.D. Coleridge, contra.-The contract is for fifty tons
of best palm oil; the insertion of the words "wet, dirty, and inferior"
is to provide, that if by accident a portion should be such, an allowance price should be made to the plaintiffs. The defendant was
offered one-fifth best and four-fifths inferior, and a contract, in which
the greater portion of the oil is inferior, is, by the reception of the
evidence of mercantile usage, substituted for a contract of best palm
oil. According to the argument on the other side, if the whole of
the oil were inferior it would have been in compliance with the contract, and the defendant would have been bound to accept it. In
all cases in which evidence of custom has been received to explain
the contract, something definite has been added to the contract which
makes it intelligible; the evidence is not to show that fifty means
five tons, but something entirely vague and uncertain is to be incorporated into the contract, which destroys it. If the contract is looked
at dehors the custom, then it has not been performed; if the contract
is to be read with the custom, then it is altogether a different conIn Hunzfrey vs.
tract to the one the parties entered into.
Dale, 7 El. & B1. 266; 3 Jur. N. S. 213, the evidence did not contradict the contract. In Truman vs. Loder, 11 Ad. & El. 599; 4
Jur., N. S. 937, Lord Denman, in delivering the judgment of the
court, lays it down as a well-known rule that the cases go no further
'Affirmed in Exchequer Chamber.
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than to permit the explanation of words used in a sense different
from their ordinary meaning, or the addition of known terms not
inconsistent with the written contract. Brown vs. Byrne, 3 El. &
Bl. 703; 18 Jur. 700, and partalivs. Beneeke, 10 0. B. 212, are
authorities that parol evidence is only receivable when the incident
which it is sought to import into the contract is consistent with the
terms of the written instrument. The case of Yates vs. _Pym, 6
Taunt. 446, is precisely in point. The substance of this contract
is for best oil; the insertion of the words "wet, dirty, and inferior
oil" is to provide for an accident; if by chance some of the oil is
wet, dirty, and inferior, the defendant is to take it, with an allowance.
ERLE, J.-I
am of opinion that this rule ought to be discharged.
The contract is to be enforced according to the intention of the
parties, who must be taken to have understood its meaning at the
time they entered into it. The contract was for fifty tons of best
palm oil, expected to arrive in Bristol from Africa per The Ohalco,
after delivery of 100 tons previously sold; wet, dirty, and inferior
oil, if any, at a fair allowance. The parties, therefore, entered into
a contract for fifty tons of oil, and left it undefined what proportion
should be wet, what proportion should be dirty, and what proportion
should be inferior. Where persons conversant with the trade, and
who know all the circumstances connected with it, leave a portion
of a contract undefined, and the time comes when such contract is
to be performed, and it is necessary to explain what they have left
undefined, the question is not whether a delivery of one-fifth of best
oil is a substantial compliance with the contract, but what evidence
is admissible to show the true construction of the contract which is
left undefined; and the question would be precisely the same if,
instead of one-fifth of best oil, four-fifths had been delivered. Somebody would have to decide between the parties what proportion of
best oil, wet, dirty, and inferior, the vendor was bound to supply
according to his contract. Those who object to the reception of the
evidence must point out who is to decide as to the meaning of the
ILord Campbell, C. J., was sitting at Nisi Prius; and Erle and Hill, JJ., were
the only judges in court.
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contract. Is the judge to say what is and what is not a compliance
with the contract? Without local knowledge no judge could construe it. Is the jury to be asked its meaning? The construction
of a written contract is not for a jury. The evidence tendered to
explain the contract was the evidence of persons conversant with the
trade, and in my opinion they are the proper parties to say what is
the meaning of the contract. There is nothing in the evidence that
contradicts or controls the contract, but it was tendered to explain
what was left ambiguous in it. This case falls within the principle
laid down in Brown vs. Byrne, 3 El. & Bl. 703; 18 Jur. 700; and
acting on the principle as expounded in that case, I am of opinion
that the evidence admitted by the learned judge at the trial was not
inconsistent with the contract, and is therefore admissible.
HILL, J.-I am of the same opinion. The parties contracting
are silent as to the proportion of oil which is to be considered
inferior, wet, and dirty; but there is an established usage of dealing in the trade at the place -where the contract was made regulating
the proportion of good and bad oil. I think evidence of such usage
to explain the contract is admissible.-Bule discharged.

In Vice Chancellor Wood's Court.
RE POWELL'S TRUST.
1. A testatrix being possessed of cash in the house, a balance at a savings bank,
for the taking out of which she had given notice, and money secured on two promissory notes payable on demand, by her will bequeathed "all her ready money :"
Held, that the terms "ready money" included the cash in the house and the
balance at the savings bank, but not the promissory notes.

The question in this case arose upon the construction of the will
of Mary Powell.
The testatrix by her will, dated the 23d October, 1856, after
directing her funeral and testamentary expenses to be paid, made
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the following bequest:-" I leave and bequeath unto David, William
and Sarah Nutting, and unto Eliza Arthur, all my ready money,
to be parted equally between them, share and share alike." The
testratrix at the time of her death was possessed of two notes of
hand payable on demand, one securing payment of 1001. and the
other 5001., and a sum of money in the savings bank, notice requiring payment of which had been given by the testatrix shortly before
she died, so that the money might have been received upon demand
before she died. She had also a small sum of cash in the house.
A petition was presented by the legatees to ascertain what they were
entitled to under the legacy of ready money.
"harles Hall, appeared for the petitioners;
Wickens, for the Crown; and
Roche, for the executors.
The following cases were cited :-Manning vs. Purcell, 7 De G.
M. & G. 55; Gosden vs. Dotterill, 1 Myl. & K. 56, Langdale vs.
Wkitfeld, 4 K. & J. 426; Parkervs. Marchant, 1 Y. & Coll. N.
S.290; S. C. on appeal, 1 Phil. 356.
The VIcE-CHANcELLOR said the question was, whether the money

secured on promissory notes and the money in the savings bank
passed under the bequest of ready money. It had been contended
by Mr. Hall, that the direction to pay money after payment of. debts
had been held in many cases to pass the whole residuary estate, as
that was the fund out of which the debts would be payable; that,
however, could not extend to a bequest of ready money. In Parker vs. Marchant,it was held that ready money included all moneys
actually in the house, and also any balance at the bankers, as,
according to the usages of society, at the present time the term ready
money applied more to the balance at the banker's than to the
money in the house. Following that case, therefore, he had no
hesitation in deciding that the sum at the savings bank, as to which
notice requiring payment had been given by the testatrix, passed
together with the 191. 131., the amount actually in the house. As
to the promissory note the same authority had decided that no
money secured on a promissory note could be considered as ready

